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European support for Egypt: billions of euros for a dictatorial “partner” in migration control

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Country/Region

27 March 2025

A year ago, the EU and Egypt announced the launch of a “strategic and comprehensive partnership.” This comes with a €7.4 billion aid and investment package from the EU to Egypt. This article analyses this development in the context of regional changes, the ineffectiveness of “external solutions” to migration, and the impact of EU-Egyptian cooperation on human rights in Egypt. It argues that European support for Egypt underpins human rights abuses. Those abuses are then ignored or sidelined so that the EU can claim Egypt is a safe and reliable “partner” for managing migration.

Former EU home affairs commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos meets Egyptian president Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, April 2014. Image: Dimitris Avramopoulos, CC BY-SA 2.0

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Summary

• In March 2024, the EU and Egypt agreed on a €7.4 billion aid package, which includes €200 million specifically for migration
• This funding comes on top of other projects worth tens of millions of euros to support Egyptian police, border and security agencies
• The EU also supported the drafting of EU asylum legislation that has been criticised for failing to meet basic human rights standards
• Egyptian government practices also clearly violate human rights: forcibly-displaced people face pushbacks, profiteering and difficulties accessing services
• The EU is complicit in these human rights abuses, but there is little sign that it will change course - a high-level meeting recently agreed that the first summit between the presidents of Egypt, the European Commission and the European Council should take place this year

Introduction

On 17 March 2024, the EU and Egypt agreed on a €7.4 billion aid package. Most of this money will be provided as a loan and is designed to increase trade and investment in Egypt, shoring up the legitimacy of the dictatorship. It also includes €200 million dedicated specifically to Egyptian border and immigration enforcement.

This article examines the EU’s growing support for Egyptian authorities and policies dealing with migration, asylum and borders. Then, it analyses relevant Egyptian legislation, some of which has been drafted with support from the EU. The third section looks at how Egypt’s position as a country of origin and transit, and as a host country, makes it strategically important to the EU.

A subsequent section examines the ways in which Egyptian authorities and private companies have sought to generate income from forcibly-displaced people and migrants. This is followed by an assessment of Egypt’s growing role in policing migration, not just at its land borders, but in the Mediterranean Sea.

EU support for the Egyptian government, and in particular its security and police agencies, ignores the human rights abuses committed by them. The EU is therefore complicit in those violations. There is little sign that the EU is going to change course. This article contends that the EU will instead use a false representation of the situation in Egypt to increase its support for the regime.

Growing EU support for Egyptian government abuses

From late 2023 to March 2024, the European Commission hurriedly struck a series of external partnership agreements in the Mediterranean region. The largest of these was the March 2024 deal signed with Egypt.

It came in the wake of a number of other agreements and funding deals with the government in Cairo. In 2024, the EU provided Egypt with €9 million in humanitarian aid for refugees and asylum-seekers. A further €20 million was earmarked by the EU for the reception of people displaced by the proxy war in Sudan – a response shaped by the war’s impact on irregular migration in the region and Mediterranean area.

Other projects have sought to strengthen the capabilities of the Egyptian border guard, which is accused of crimes including enforced disappearance, torture, arbitrary detention and forced deportation of refugees.

In November 2024, €20 million from the so-called European Peace Facility was awarded to the Egyptian Armed Forces. The aim is to increase the military’s ability “to enhance the national security and stability of the Arab Republic of Egypt, as well as to enhance the protection of civilians.”

The EU also provides funding for security cooperation projects for North African countries. A separate project aims to enhance “the capacity of law enforcement agencies across North Africa to effectively investigate and prosecute organized crime groups involved in migrant smuggling and, where appropriate, human trafficking.”

EU documents detail that the overall goal and impact of support to Egypt and other North African states is to “contribute to enhancing border security and integrity through mutually beneficial cross-border cooperation.” The intended cooperation should be “especially against organized crime groups, including those involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking.” The main specified interim objective is to “establish or strengthen cross-border operational cooperation between border management authorities.”

The EU intends to sign ‘anti-smuggling’ agreements for source and transit countries, including Egypt and Libya. Tunisia is already on board. These agreements are meant to strengthen security cooperation in the region through cooperation with actors such as Frontex and Europol. The EU would like this to include sharing sensitive personal data, although documents indicate that the Egyptian authorities have so far been unwilling to agree to that level of cooperation.

EU funds have also been given to Egypt to host Palestine’s wounded and injured. The EU has provided almost €5.5 million for medical care. At the same time, the Egyptian authorities have profited from Palestinians crossing into Egypt and denied them residence permits and access to services.

That is not all: Egyptian authorities have abused thousands of Sudanese asylum-seekers, detaining them in secret detention facilities, denying them the right to apply for asylum, and ultimately illegally expelling them to Sudan. This has not affected European support for the authorities. Neither have the systematic hate speech campaigns broadcast on social media against refugees, asylum seekers, migrants, and people who defend them.

Bilateral cooperation is also ongoing between Egypt and European states. On 29 April 2024, the Egyptian interior ministry announced the launch of workshops and training sessions for the second phase of an Italian-Egyptian security cooperation project to strengthen police action against migrant smuggling. Following this, security agencies in Egypt stepped up the targeting of refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers.

Previous agreements for ‘anti-smuggling’ or ‘migration governance and border control’ have failed to curb irregular migration. In fact, these agreements perpetuate the causes of irregular migration, increase its risks, and endorse authoritarian regimes in the region.

Violations committed by Egypt through its military and security apparatus against citizens and forcibly displaced people cannot be separated from the support, training, capacity building, equipment, and intelligence provided by the EU or its member states.

A decade of laws to violate forcibly displaced people’s rights

The new asylum law

On 7 June 2023, the Egyptian Council of Ministers issued Decree 243/2023, a proposed asylum law. It came alongside a decision ^[1] concerning what the Egyptian authorities referred to as “legalising the presence of foreigners in Egypt.”

Through the “legalisation” decision, authorities compelled people without residence permits in Egypt to legalise their status for a specific period. To do so, they had to pay US$1,000 to the immigration authorities affiliated with the interior ministry. Human rights groups branded the measure illegal and as not fulfilling the bill’s stated purpose.

The details of the asylum bill were kept secret. Demands from human rights organisations to review the bill, participate in the legislative drafting process, and submit proposals for the draft law were ignored.

It appears that this law was, at least in part, a result of a “roadmap” agreed between the EU Asylum Agency and the Egyptian authorities. The roadmap included “activities to support the drafting of national asylum legislation,” amongst other things (pdf). Wael Badawi, a senior migration official in Egypt's foreign affairs ministry, told a conference in Vienna in October 2024 that the EU Asylum Agency had supported the drafting of the law.

On 22 October 2024, the Egyptian parliament’s Defence and National Security Committee issued a statement approving the asylum bill. A committee member told the press that they had approved the bill the day it arrived. This happened despite human rights-based objections to the bill. It swiftly passed through parliament and was adopted without substantial debate, despite warnings that it contravened international obligations.

Local and international organisations called for the law to be sent back to parliament. However, the president approved it on 17 December 2024. UN experts warned of a host of problems: criminalisation and deprivation of liberty; violation of the principle of non-refoulement; the protection of women; and access to justice, amongst others.

State media, meanwhile, welcomed the law as Egypt’s first asylum law. However, there was a pre-existing legal mechanism based on a memorandum of understanding between the Egyptian government and UNHCR. Though it had many flaws, the mechanism shared responsibility for the registration and recognition of refugee status between UNHCR and Egypt.

Border areas as military zones

The asylum system in Egypt cannot be reduced to the new asylum law or the old asylum system. Other legislation developed over the last decade affects forcibly displaced people residing in and transiting through Egypt. First off, in 2014, the President issued a decree designating border areas as military zones. Unauthorised presence in these zones was made a criminal offence.

Egyptian border guard data shows that, between 2016 and 2021, this decision led to over 100,000 people of different nationalities being stopped in border areas (military authorities ceased making the information available after 2021). An EU document from 2022 indicates that Egyptian authorities reported having stopped over 27,000 migrants who sought to exit Egypt at the border with Libya in 2021. It did not state what risk assessment was undertaken regarding the listed operations.

Although Egyptian authorities provide details on European cooperation for the Egyptian coast and border guards, they do not report on detainees’ legal proceedings. Reports from human rights organisations show that people have been subjected to unlawful detention and military trials. Many have been forcibly deported. UNHCR reported that Egyptian authorities did not grant access to detention facilities or enable refugees to register with them.

Law on “unlawful migration”

A 2016 law to combat unlawful migration ^[2] entirely disregarded basic rights and safeguards for migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers in the migration and registration processes. Instead, the law solely addressed irregular migration from a security viewpoint, introducing harsher penalties.

The law led to thousands of arrests across the country. People were detained on charges of smuggling, with no evidence. Some have since been released by prosecutors. From January 2019 to March 2023, Egyptian security authorities arrested 1,250 people to counter ‘illegal’ immigration. Charges were laid in 1,030 cases. These figures come from the government’s own report to the UN Human Rights Council.

The interior ministry also uses past charges to detain people and pass them through the judicial system again. Activists refer to this as “recycling”. This may be done to inflate the number of prosecutions, or to demonstrate ‘good’ performance in tackling migration – vis-à-vis the public, the EU, or other ‘partners.’

Egypt as a ‘strategic’ partner for Europe

Despite these abuses and violations, the EU considers that Egypt has a “strategic” role for the “prosperity, security and stability of the central Mediterranean region.” This is partly due to its role in relation to the movement of people. Egypt is a country of origin and transit, as well as a country that hosts large numbers of migrants and refugees.

Measures that rely on militarisation and criminalisation as the two main approaches to border and migration management have been costly for the rights of Egyptians and non-Egyptians. By ignoring the root causes of irregular immigration, the EU's approach based on ‘external solutions’ is counterproductive.

A country of origin

EU interest in Egypt as a country of origin has recently increased, despite a lack of departures from its coasts since 2017. EU documents show an increase in Mediterranean crossings for the third year running: in 2021, there were 67,724 registered arrivals across the Mediterranean, 105,561 in 2022, and 158,020 in 2023. In each of these years, Egyptians were amongst the top three nationalities recorded for Mediterranean crossings after Bangladeshis, despite the number of Egyptians making the journey decreasing by 45.1% in 2023.

EU analyses ignore the root causes of the movement of citizens and expatriates. The favoured approach is for prohibition at source. This support enables greater control to be exercised by a dictatorial regime that represses both Egyptians and non-Egyptians, enacting widespread abuses and violations – which in turn contributes to people wanting to leave the country.

At the same time, Egypt is enduring an economic crisis that compels young people to choose between deadly options: either entering Libya to depart for Europe by sea, or using the Balkan route, rather than staying in a country where a repressive regime has stifled progress and opportunities for newer generations. As Timothy E. Kaldas has put it: “The past decade of repressive, extractive, and disorganized governance has imposed an enormous toll on Egyptians, their state, and their country.”

A country of transit

Egypt has become a major transit country, as even Egyptians wishing to migrate have to relocate to departure points abroad. Meanwhile, the risks for forcibly displaced people in Egypt, including refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers, have increased due to prosecutions, deportations, registration issues, and legal changes.

An escalation in legal or semi-legal transit and transport routes used by migrants to reach Egypt has been reported by Frontex. These concern in particular Bangladeshi, Syrian and Pakistani citizens and expatriates. From Egypt, these people travel on to Libya, and sometimes Tunisia and Algeria, to reach coastal departure points and to head for Europe.

Egyptians are purportedly among the leading non-EU citizens suspected of human trafficking, according to an EU document (PDF). Human rights groups report that hundreds of Egyptians have been subjected to investigations, charges, and detention (especially in Italy and Greece), but prosecutions have often been malicious or ill-founded. In the ‘Pylos 9’ case, nine Egyptians were jailed in Greece despite the Greek authorities knowing they were innocent.

A host country

Egypt hosts over nine million migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. IOM data, based on data provided by the Egyptian authorities, shows that these communities represent nearly 9% of Egypt's population. Within this group, 80% are Sudanese, Syrians, Yemenis, and Libyans. 1.4 million people are currently registered with UNHCR and endure difficult circumstances due to a series of government regulations. These make people’s legal status even more insecure.

That being said, the IOM reported in 2022 that “60% of those international migrants living in Egypt are well integrated for more than 10 years (5.5 million persons), with 6% integrated for 15 years or more (second generations included).” The Egyptian authorities are, nevertheless, keen to portray Egypt as burdened by the provision of services to non-citizens—contrary to the truth—to show that Egypt needs additional support.

Refugees: forced into legal limbo and turned into cash machines

For the EU, then, Egypt has a key role to play in containing the movement of people who may seek to travel to Europe. The country’s negotiating hand is further strengthened by developments across the Afro-Asian region: a proxy war in North Sudan, Israel's genocidal campaign against Palestinians in Gaza and beyond, and continuing migration by Syrian asylum seekers from other African countries. The Egyptian authorities have used these developments to secure more money from international institutions, government ‘partners’ and forcibly displaced people.

Soon after the proxy war in Sudan began, Egyptian authorities changed the rules for people travelling into Egypt. The Four Freedoms Agreement between Egypt and Sudan includes the freedom to migrate. However, the authorities gradually cancelled the right of Sudanese citizens to move to Egypt unless a visa was requested in advance.

Companies sprang up offering to complete these new visa procedures for prices ranging between US$2,000 and US$3,500 per person. Authorities then cancelled some of the rules allowing Syrian citizens visa-free entry. This was done so that they, too, would be preyed upon by companies linked to the Egyptian security services that profit from these situations.

Reports also show that, over the past two years, Palestinians have been forced to pay large amounts of money to a company called Hala Travel, owned by Ibrahim al-Argani. The leader of an armed militia in the North Sinai, Ibrahim al-Argani’s name recently became prominent due to his company profiting from the humanitarian crisis caused by Israel’s genocidal military campaign in the Gaza Strip. Palestinian adults were charged between US$5,000 and US$10,000 for journeys into Egypt. Al-Argani also has business interests in the reconstruction of Libya.

Another form of profiteering can be seen in residence permit procedures. Egyptian authorities give very remote appointment dates to people seeking a residence permit from the interior ministry’s immigration department. Waiting times can exceed two years: some refugees have dates scheduled for 2027. The authorities then arrest people who lack the right papers and force them to pay US$1,000 and other fines to be released, for the opportunity to obtain a temporary residence permit, and to be protected from deportation.^[3]

From pushbacks at land borders to dangerous acts in the Mediterranean

EU funding and advice for the Egyptian security, police and border authorities supports more than the policy of pushbacks towards Sudan or Libya. It is also linked to Egypt's role in policing migration across the Mediterranean Sea. This support is ultimately intended to demonstrate that Egypt is a “safe country” for migrants and refugees.

EU documents show that departures from the Egyptian coastline ceased in 2017, with cross-Mediterranean migration routes shifting towards Libya. However, in June 2022, the EU allocated €80 million in funding to the Egyptian Coast Guard for ‘capacity strengthening’. This included purchasing three rescue boats and implementing training through CIVIPOL and IOM.

Last summer, the Egyptian Navy began to display its capabilities in the Mediterranean for the first time in a decade. On 23 July 2024 at 5:42 AM Cairo time, the Egyptian Armed Forces issued a statement: “The naval forces succeeded in rescuing an illegal immigration boat with (31) individuals on board after it suffered a technical failure.” Refugees Platform in Egypt reported that the Egyptians who survived were charged, but the authorities did not disclose the outcome for non-Egyptian survivors.

There were similar incidents later in the year. A December statement said the navy “succeeds in thwarting the illegal immigration attempt” of a boat with 63 people on board (60 Egyptians and three Sudanese nationals). They were then handed over to “the specialised authorities to take legal action against them.” Earlier this month, Alarm Phone reported that a merchant vessel disembarked 42 people rescued from a vessel in distress in Port Said.

Frontex has also sought to increase its cooperation with Egypt. Following a meeting on “security and law enforcement” in Cairo in June 2023, Egyptian interior ministry officials visited the Frontex headquarters in Warsaw in December 2023.

“The visit intends to familiarise the representatives of the Arab Republic of Egypt with the working methods and the mandate of Frontex,” said a letter from Frontex’s director, Hans Leitjens. It would also “provide an excellent opportunity to identify areas of shared interest and exchanges on avenues for future cooperation,” Leitjens wrote.

The visit was funded via the EU4BorderSecurity project, which involves cooperation between Frontex and various North African states. “Through this project, Frontex can offer to Egypt a set of capacity building activities based on your needs in the field of migration and border management,” said one document released by Frontex under EU access to documents rules.

This cooperation continues despite ongoing impunity for hundreds of deaths at sea. The Egyptian authorities have not yet investigated the state's responsibility in the sinking of the Rashid boat in 2016, which is believed to have caused the death of at least 300 people. As elsewhere in the region, European migration and security policies take precedence over people’s rights.

Latest developments

During an Egyptian parliamentary meeting on 2 December 2024, an urgent dossier came from the president’s office for discussion and approval. It concerned €1 billion received as short-term loans from the EU, part of a larger €5 billion package, itself part of the €7.4 billion agreed in March 2024. The deal was swiftly approved, although negotiations around the remaining €4 billion of this package are ongoing.

The remaining €4 billion will be allocated to Egypt in three instalments. Political conditionality should be attached to this funding, as demanded by some European politicians. However, Egyptian officials have rejected such conditionality in recent meetings, a source close to the negotiation process has claimed.

Their demands may have been taken on board by EU officials. The European Parliament’s draft resolution on the proposal did not mention human rights. The explanatory statement of the rapporteur for the file, Celine Imar, an MEP for the right-wing European People’s Party, says:

“This MFA [macro-financial assistance] is based on strict pre-conditions requiring Egypt to continue to make concrete and credible steps towards democratic mechanism, rule of law and human rights. The rapporteur believes that those pre-conditions embedded in the long-term cooperation with Egypt will lead to reforms and long-term improvements in the country.

(…)

Some may feel that things are not moving fast enough, but it is hard to deny that the country is on the right track.”

Three days after the European Parliament’s vote, a high-level meeting was held in Cairo between the Egyptian foreign minister and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs. The statement delivered by the Egyptian Foreign Minister at the closing conference said that there was agreement to:

• Activate the political axis of the partnership, and accordingly, hold the first Egyptian-European summit in 2025 at the level of the President of the Republic, the President of the European Commission, and the President of the European Council.
• Activate the economic, investment, and trade axis, by facilitating access for Egyptian goods and products to the EU and European investment in Egypt
• Strengthen regular migration routes between Egypt and the EU and enhance the “talent partnership” designed to allow labour migration from Egypt to the EU

The Egyptian foreign minister noted that Egypt looks forward to further support from the EU due to the “tremendous burden” imposed by the number of foreigners present in the country.

Conclusion

The EU’s support for the Egyptian authorities raises serious questions. Egypt is recognised by the EU as a pivotal regional player. This recognition, and the EU’s interest in controlling migration, underpins support to expand Egypt’s border control efforts, backing for refugee legislation, and may herald an increase in “pushback” operations to Egypt. One way this might be done is by claiming that Egypt is a “safe country.” The EU is currently preparing legislation with a common list of “safe” third countries, though it remains to be seen which states will be put on the list.

Cooperation with external “partners” is a clear priority for the EU. Magnus Brunner, the Commissioner for Internal Affairs and Migration, has said that the EU must be “open-minded” and explore “new ideas” to curb unlawful migration. He has argued that so-called “return centres” outside the EU (that is, deportation camps in non-EU states) can be run “in a humane and legally sound manner.” Could Egypt be a potential location for such an initiative?

Giorgia Meloni’s Italy agreement with Albania exemplifies this strategy. However, it has faced continual rejection by Italian courts and is under review by the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The relationship between widespread human rights abuses against citizens and non-citizens in Egypt and ongoing support to strengthen the country’s police, border and military forces requires urgent reconsideration. Whatever risk assessments are undertaken as part of these projects, it is hard to see how they take meaningful account of human rights issues.

Rights violations continue at borders and in cities, as does the targeting of civil society. Social control over public and digital spaces is being extended in the name of ‘security’. Mismanagement and corruption lead to continually worsening economic conditions. These are root causes for migration, which also give rise to rebellious sentiment among the people. EU support for security and police agencies involved in human rights abuses turns a blind eye to such violations, making the EU complicit in them.

Author: Nour Khalil, researcher and journalist specialising in migration and asylum policies and border violence, and Executive Director of the Refugees Platform in Egypt (RPE).

Notes

[1] Decision No. 3326/2023 of the Egyptian Council of Ministers.

[2] Law 82/2016.

[3] Decision No. 3326/2023 concerning the legalisation of the status of foreigners is one legal basis for these actions.

Further reading