US President Donald Trump has worked quickly to overcome Iranian resistance to nuclear talks, now set to launch in Oman on April 12. Trump has been clear in his desire to resolve the issue diplomatically and avoid war in the Middle East. But he and his team surely know that within a relatively short time, he is likely to face the decision point on whether or not to pursue a military strike.  

The timing, need, and opportunity may never be more compelling. And, arguably, a military option is more feasible now than at any time in recent decades. 

Trump has set a sixty-day target to reach a deal. The Iranians will be adept at extending that timeline. But if negotiations peter out and the looming reimposition of sanctions—the snapback—occurs, with an Iranian response, Washington will reach a crisis. For Trump, that will be the point of decision over escalation. 

Stubborn gaps 

If and when talks get serious, the two sides will face major gaps. Trump is seeking a tougher deal than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).  

His aims include fully dismantling Tehran’s nuclear program. Such a dismantling would require the removal and destruction of its enrichment capability, including recently installed advanced centrifuges; the export of all but a token amount of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile; and intrusive international inspections of all declared nuclear sites and undeclared sites in perpetuity with no sunsets. 

Based on all Iranian behavior in previous rounds of negotiations, there is no reason to believe Tehran would agree to these terms. Iran has for decades worked to assemble an industrial nuclear program, which the regime believes to be key to its survival. The notion that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, at age eighty-five and nearing the end of his rule, would agree to give it all up is implausible. 

If, somehow, Iran did show openness to a full dismantlement, it would surely insist on major sanctions relief in exchange. Iranian leaders could only justify accepting what they would see as humiliating terms on the nuclear program if it would bring dramatic economic relief to their people. 

But US sanctions against Iran encompass a wide range of goals beyond its nuclear program. Designations include constraints on Iran’s ballistic missile program, its proliferation or acquisition of advanced military equipment, Tehran’s vast terrorist proxy network (including Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen), and its human rights abuses. Some of these sanctions, such as those contained in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, could only be removed through legislation. There is scant appetite in the US Congress for this level of sanctions relief against a long-time adversary.  

Meanwhile, a deadline looms in October for the snapback of sanctions against Iran that were suspended when it signed the JCPOA. After Trump withdrew from the deal during his first term in 2018, Iran began to violate the agreement’s terms, installing centrifuges and enriching uranium beyond the prescribed amounts.

The remaining members of the deal, which include the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China, may initiate the snapback of pre-JCPOA sanctions, which no member of the United Nations Security Council can veto.  

Trump’s National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM), aimed at imposing “maximum pressure” on Iran, calls for working with the United States’ European partners to implement the snapback, and the initial diplomatic moves to trigger this process must take place by late summer. 

Potential outcomes 

Given these challenges, three options are likely to emerge from the negotiations: One, a limited deal that does not fundamentally dismantle Iran’s program, but buys some time; two, no deal, the deadline approaching, and the imposition of snapback sanctions, leading to a crisis; and three, a military strike against the nuclear program. 

There is precedent for the limited deal option. In 2013, Iran agreed to the Joint Plan of Action, which provided limited sanctions relief in exchange for Iran freezing certain aspects of its nuclear program and modestly (and reversibly) downgrading others. A “less-for-less” deal of this type could conceivably kick the can down the road, relieving Trump or Khamenei from having to make a fateful decision. It could include a new United Nations Security Council Resolution extending the snapback timeline.  

But now, Iran’s program is at such an advanced stage that a freeze would still leave it capable of breaking out at a time of its choosing. By all estimations, Iran sits on the threshold of nuclear breakout—the ability to produce a sufficient quantity of highly enriched uranium to assemble a nuclear device. In February, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had tripled its stockpile of sixty percent enriched uranium in just three months and now possessed enough—if enriched to ninety percent—to manufacture several weapons. Meanwhile, reports persist that Iranian scientists, without a clear direction from the supreme leader, are conducting research that would shorten the path to building a nuclear weapon, if they are ever ordered to do so. In the face of these realities, a limited deal would be at odds with the urgency Trump has repeatedly conveyed to address Iran’s nuclear program in a definitive way. 

Passing the deadline with no resolution would allow a very precarious situation to persist. If there is no progress in negotiations, the United States and its European partners are unlikely to let the snapback deadline pass without restoring sanctions. But Iran has countered that if snapback occurs, it will retaliate, perhaps by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which would mean the end of IAEA inspections) or, conceivably, by taking steps toward a breakout it has until now foregone. The situation would linger on an even sharper knife’s edge than it does today. 

That leaves a military strike, which could be executed by the United States, Israel, or the two in combination, perhaps even with the support of others. Whatever limited chance there is for success in negotiations, it will depend on Iran perceiving a credible military threat—and the willingness to use it.  

Trump and his team have said clearly that dealing with the problem militarily is the only option if negotiations fail, but showing is more persuasive than telling. The deployment of B-2 stealth bombers to Diego Garcia in late March is a useful example. Those aircraft have reportedly been used in operations against the Houthis in Yemen, as they were on a previous round of strikes against the Houthis in October 2024. But US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth suggested Iran must consider that this highly capable aircraft and the heavy payloads it can carry could also be employed against their nuclear sites. 

The logic of a military strike 

There are two key reasons why the military option may be more imminent now than in the last decades of the Tehan-Washington standoff.  

The first is the result of Israel’s retaliatory strikes against Iran on October 26, 2024. Using capabilities Iran had not previously seen and had no means to detect or intercept, Israel did more than just strike its targets. It struck a psychological blow against Tehran, leaving Iran aware that it was highly vulnerable to additional strikes and had a significantly reduced ability to protect key locations, including nuclear sites. 

Second, Israel’s decimation of Hezbollah in the fall of 2024 eliminates a major response option Iran had long counted on to deter an Israeli or US strike and to retaliate if it ever came. By all accounts—prior to the war in Gaza that began with the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023—Hezbollah possessed well over one hundred thousand rockets and missiles it could use to target Israel. The stockpile included several thousand with precision guidance that could target strategic sites and major population centers, numerically overwhelming Israel’s air defenses. Once Israel completed a significant weakening of Hamas in Gaza, it turned to the north. Using precise intelligence gathered over many years, Israel eliminated the vast majority of Hezbollah’s advanced weapons before they were even prepared for launch. The result is that, for the first time in years, Israel no longer needs to fear a massive Hezbollah missile barrage as a response to operations against Iran. That Iranian deterrent is gone. 

The United States could choose to strike alone, intending to set back Tehran’s nuclear program for a meaningful period of time. As that decision point is still some time off, current deployments do not necessarily reflect the assets that would be employed in such a strike. But the news that a second carrier strike group is arriving in the region to supplement the one currently engaged in counter-Houthi strikes demonstrates the US military’s capability to flow a variety of assets to the region to prepare for a range of contingencies. 

Alternatively, Trump could signal to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that he does not object to an Israeli strike—a so-called green light. Israel would almost certainly need to operate in areas that are in proximity to US forces, so some degree of coordination or deconfliction would be necessary. As it demonstrated in its October 2024 strikes, Israel has significant capabilities—not identical to Washington’s, but meaningful and perhaps surprising. The United States and Israel would have to agree on the goal of such an operation and assess Israel’s ability to achieve it. 

The most effective option may be a combined US-Israeli operation. Israel’s integration into US Central Command over the past four years has significantly upgraded the interoperability of US and Israeli forces. Following the strong defense support the United States provided to Israel since the October 7 attacks, military-to-military trust is at an all-time high. A combined strike that divides up key tasks, maximizing each country’s unique capabilities, might achieve the most significant setback of the Iranian nuclear program and, importantly, limit Iran’s ability and incentive to respond. Trump suggested he may see an Israeli-led attack, in which the United States participates, as the most likely scenario. 

Any such military operation comes with risk and the need for Washington to protect its regional forces, allies, and partners—including Israel and the Gulf states. Already, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Mohammad Qalibaf threatened that Iran would attack US forces and their host nations in the Gulf in response to a US strike.  

Iran possesses a large arsenal of ballistic missiles with the range to reach those locations. And Iran previously made the reckless decision—twice—to attack Israel directly from Iran. So a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities requires defensive preparations, including buttressed air defenses. Some of these preparations will be visible and may indeed have a deterrent effect on Iran, or, in the best case, help produce eleventh-hour concessions that might make it possible to avoid the strike entirely. But having made the decision to strike, leaders have to be prepared to follow through if necessary. 

Deterrence strategies 

There are additional ways to deter or limit Iranian retaliation. Trump might communicate in negotiations that the goal of the operation is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, but that if Iran responds and there are significant US or allied casualties, additional strikes could target the stability of the regime or its energy infrastructure. Iran has long envisioned a nuclear option as a potential guarantor of regime stability. But with that option removed, Khamenei might opt for standing down in exchange for sparing his regime and its economic foundations. 

Iran has the knowledge to reconstitute any nuclear assets that are damaged or destroyed. Estimations of how long it would take Iran to do so are generally based on the time needed to carry out physical reconstruction and do not fully take into account political, economic, or deterrence barriers to doing so.  

A successful military operation might buy considerably more time than one thinks. Even so, the United States should only undertake such an operation if it is prepared to potentially repeat it. Planners must realistically scope the force posture required in the Middle East to keep that option available and consider how doing so affects US commitments in other theaters, particularly the Indo-Pacific. 

Military action must always be undertaken with full awareness of the tactical and strategic risks involved. But to achieve the goal he has set with Iran, Trump may find that the moment has come. 

Daniel B. Shapiro is a distinguished fellow in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. He has previously served as Washington’s deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel. 

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Image: FILE PHOTO: A 3D-printed miniature model of U.S. President Donald Trump and the U.S. and Iran flags are seen in this illustration taken January 15, 2025. REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration/File Photo